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 How Civil Procedure Fails (And Why 
Administrative Justice is Better) 
 
A L L A N  C .  H U T C H I N S O N   
he demand for more and better procedural fairness is a rallying-cry 
that receives almost universal support. All participants in the legal 
process – litigants, judges, legislators and lawyers – maintain that 
the justice of any outcome can be both affected by the quality of the 
procedures relied upon and offset by the failure to provide access to 
appropriate and balanced procedural opportunities. Indeed, unless losing 
litigants or applicants think that they are getting a fair shake when it 
comes to the procedures used, there will be even greater dissatisfaction 
with losing than otherwise might be the case. However, while good or fair 
procedures will not guarantee satisfaction, let alone fair decisions, they will 
go some of the way to placating people’s sense of dissatisfaction.1 As such, 
in a complex and disputatious society like Canada, there seems to be more 
agreement, although far from unanimous, on what might count as a fair 
procedure than on what would be treated as a fair result. This explains the 
attention that lawyers and judges pay to the fairness of different 
procedures in different areas of dispute. Getting procedure right obviates 
the more thorny challenge of getting substance right. 
In this reflective provocation, I want to explore a little more critically 
the whole idea and practice of procedural fairness. Although there is 
ample rhetoric on the importance and nature of procedural fairness across 
 
*  Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto, Canada. I am grateful to Trevor Farrow, Jennifer Leitch, Janet Mosher, 
Lorne Sossin and others for critical assistance and intellectual support. This essay is 
dedicated to Garry Watson, friend, mentor and ‘the man on the mountain’ in all 
things procedural. 
1  There is a large socio-legal literature on this. See, for example, Tom. R. Tyler et al., 
Social Justice In A Diverse Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997). 
T 
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the legal landscape and by its various protagonists, there is little attention 
paid to the unevenness and availability of the actual procedures 
recommended and institutionalized. One way to come at this issue is to 
compare and contrast how procedural fairness is treated in the 
jurisprudence on civil procedure and on administrative law; commentators 
and judges are too easily blinded to the benefits of such a comparative 
analysis. Despite a shared commitment to procedural farness and its ideal 
centrality to each, there are some glaring inconsistencies between how civil 
procedure and administrative law operationalize this critical idea. The 
basic thrust of my critique, as this essay’s title suggests, is that civil 
procedure comes a poor second to administrative law in its willingness to 
take seriously and implement a basic structure and doctrine of procedural 
fairness. Although administrative law in practice is far from perfect, it 
seems to have an edge over the practice of civil procedure. There is much 
in this to ponder and change because, to paraphrase Lon Fuller,2 if we get 
things wrong procedurally, we are much less likely to get things right 
substantively. 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
It seems axiomatic that the amount and quality of procedure that a 
person is entitled to will vary depending on the dispute and its informing 
context. As a rule of thumb, the more serious and weighty the dispute and 
the consequences of its resolution, the more procedural options and 
opportunities a person can expect to receive. There is no one set of 
procedural entitlements that can be offered or resorted to in any formulaic 
or absolutist way. As with so many other things, there will need to be a 
balancing of factors and considerations – rights, resources, expectations, 
reliances, remedies, consequences, etc. – to achieve, as the Ontario Rules 
of Civil Procedure put it, “the just, most expeditious and least expensive 
determination of every civil proceeding on its merits.”3 In particular, the 
central challenge will be how to trade-off and square these four vital 
 
2  Lon L. Fuller, “What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers” 
(1948) 1 J Legal Educ 189 at 204 (“If we do things the right way, we are likely to do 
the right thing”). I will concentrate on the situation in Ontario, but, in doing so, I 
think that my observations and conclusions have relevance across Canada. 
3   Rules of Civil Procedure, O Reg 575/07, s 6 (1), r 1.04 (1) [Rules]. 




dimensions of procedural fairness – the justice of outcomes reached, the 
time spent litigating, the funds invested in litigating, and resolution on the 
merits of the dispute. As is often the case, there is no tried-and-true basis 
on which to address and meet that conundrum. Unfortunately, nor is 
there any consensus about how to go about doing that. 
The judges and jurists who deal with civil procedure matters too often 
get lost in the doctrinal and interpretive details; there is little reflection on 
the overall scheme and objectives of the civil justice system. However, 
administrative lawyers and judges have devoted considerable time and 
attention to developing a broad matrix within which this balancing task 
can be approached and answered; they have grappled with not only what is 
meant by the principles of procedural fairness generally, but also what is 
the better way to operationalize those principles across the vast spectrum 
of different administrative tribunals, decision-making, and institutional 
contexts. As was said by Justice Le Dain in Cardinal in 1985, “the right to a 
fair hearing must be regarded as an independent, unqualified right which 
finds its essential justification in the sense of procedural justice which any 
person affected by an administrative decision is entitled to have.”4  
Although there is still much work to be done within administrative law, 
the basic framework is in play; it is now as much about its more detailed 
elaboration, practical orientation and doctrinal fine-tuning as anything 
else.5 
The key and most expansive judgment on procedural fairness remains 
that of the Supreme Court in 1999 in Baker.6 In regard to a deportation 
case, the Court took the occasion to lay out a two-part approach to 
procedural fairness; the duty and the content. First, the Court explained 
how the context of any particular case or hearing would be determinative 
in deciding the degree of flexibility that would be allowed in shaping the 
particular application of a fair procedure. In particular, the Court laid 
down five factors that should be considered: (1) the nature of the decision; 
(2) the nature of the statutory scheme; (3) the importance of the decision 
 
4  Cardinal v Kent Institution (Director), [1985] 2 SCR 643 [Cardinal]. 
5  I do not want to leave the impression that I think that administrative law is 
thoroughly or decisively in good shape. See Allan C. Hutchinson, “Why I Don’t 
Teach Administrative Law (And Perhaps Why I Should?)” (2016) 53 Osgoode Hall LJ 
1033. 
6  Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817. 
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to the affected person; (4) the presence of any legitimate expectations; and 
(5) the choice of procedure made by the decision-maker. These 
considerations are not intended to be exhaustive and they are not meant 
to be in any order of priority. The idea was that different levels of 
procedure made available would be calibrated in line with these factors. 
So, while one situation might demand a full and trial-like process with all 
the bells and whistles associated with such occasions, another situation 
might warrant a more relaxed, informal and lesser set of procedural 
avenues. The court has encouraged tribunals and adjudicators to adopt a 
suitably pragmatic mentality in modelling this adaptable sliding-scale in 
fulfilling their administrative mandate.  
In the second part of Baker, in its judgment on content, the Court 
outlined what is meant by treating a litigant or applicant in a procedurally 
fair way. It emphasized that individuals should have the opportunity to 
present their case fully and fairly; that any decision affecting their rights, 
interests, or privileges should be the product of using a fair, impartial and 
open process; and that the statutory, institutional and social context of the 
decisions should be considered. As such, the Court introduced a level and 
content of procedural fairness that left little doubt that the government 
had an obligation in the creation, establishment, operation, and 
populating of tribunals that, even if courts might be willing to defer on 
matters of substance, they would insist that the basic tenets of procedural 
justice should be closely followed and respected. 
Over the past two decades, the courts have begun to flesh out what the 
duty of procedural fairness demands in terms of its content and 
parameters. In general, there has been an acknowledgment that 
participation alone is insufficient and that meaningful participation is 
required.7  As such, although still based on and derived from the two key 
principles of the right to be heard (audi alteram partem) and lack of bias 
(nemo iudex in sua causa), they have been deepened and broadened to 
include a range of sub-principles that include:  
• right to notice – there should be no surprises or ambushes; 
 
7  See, for example, Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 SCC 38 
[Charkaoui]. For a good summary of this, see Colleen Flood and Lorne Sossin, 
Administrative Law In Context, 2nd ed (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publications, 
2013) at 147-84.  Of course, without state-funded counsel, this right does not amount 
to much. 




• right to a hearing – there should be an open and public setting for 
decision-making; 
• right to make submissions – there should be opportunities to 
participate meaningfully; 
• right to counsel – there should be the possibility of professional 
advocacy and help; 
• right to cross-examine – there should be the chance to challenge 
witnesses and evidence; 
• right to reasons – there should be reasonable explanation given for 
any decision made. 
Taken together these requirements, while admittedly applied and 
adjusted in a loose and selective situation-specific manner, amount to a 
relatively rich and detailed account of procedural fairness. Although the 
Supreme Court has managed to tie itself in knots over the standard for 
review,8 it has been consistent and concerted in its efforts to give the right 
to a fair hearing in administrative law some real substance and bite. It has, 
in a manner of speaking, been prepared to put its doctrinal money where 
its principled mouth is. Of course, while there are some encouraging signs, 
whether these statements of law have reaped practical rewards in the actual 
and quotidian operation of administrative tribunals and decision-making 
remains a largely open question: the practice often fails to live up to the 
theory. Having said that, the extent and sophistication of judicial efforts to 
take seriously procedural fairness in administrative law stands in sharp 
contrast with similar efforts in civil procedure. 
FORMAL SLIPS 
When it comes to civil actions, the applicable Rules offer a wide range 
of procedural devices and openings to ensure that the best effort is made 
to facilitate a fair and just result for actions brought. Many of the features 
of procedural fairness are incorporated into the Rules so as to enable 
litigants, both plaintiffs and defendants, to have the fairest and most 
conducive means through which to resolve their dispute and obtain 
substantive justice. By way of comparison to administrative law, the Rules 
provide crafted solutions to notice-giving, disclosure, timeliness, 
 
8  See Hutchinson, supra note 5 at 1043-47. 
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participation, order, evidence-presentation, cross-examination, motions, 
and the like; the limits to these procedural mechanisms are as important 
as their original design and purpose. Different levels of procedure are 
available for different disputes and venues; the amount in dispute is often 
the decisive criterion. However, the Rules seem to have taken on a very 
technical life of their own: they have become the framework for a 
sophisticated and distracting game of litigational cat-and-mouse. Apart 
from occasional exhortations to act expeditiously and fairly, there is little 
of an underlying theory or philosophy of procedural fairness that animates 
and guides their application in civil actions. 
As far as the courts’ Rules jurisprudence is concerned, there is no 
overarching or developed account of procedural justice in civil procedure.9  
There are judicial snippets here and there, but the basic view seems to be 
that the Rules of Civil Procedure set out the general framework and there 
is no need for such an elaboration: the role of the courts is often restricted 
to discrete, technical and narrow acts of statutory interpretation. 
Moreover, even in pursuing this limited and self-imposed task, the courts 
have worked by and large in a formalistic and unimaginative way. There 
are very few instances in which judges have taken the opportunity to 
recommend or develop a more integrated account of what procedural 
fairness is and how it might be put into play in civil actions. This 
shortcoming is especially apparent when civil procedure is compared to 
the dense doctrine that has been assembled in administrative law. The 
judge has considerable discretion under the Rules to construe the Rules 
liberally so as to achieve just outcomes.10  
However, when the courts have taken a less cramped and more 
expansive approach to procedural fairness, the focus and product has been 
less than encouraging. Indeed, the stance taken runs almost opposite to 
that of a Baker-like doctrine in administrative law. A strong and recent 
 
9  One of the few serious and convincing Canadian efforts to offer such an account is by 
Trevor Farrow. He seeks to critique existing approaches and offer alternatives ways of 
thinking about and advancing access to justice. See Trevor Farrow, Civil Justice, 
Privatization, And Democracy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). See also See 
Roderick MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale and 
Ambitions” in Julia Bass, William A. Bogart And Frederick H. Zemans, eds, Access To 
Justice For A New Century:  The Way Forward (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 
2005). 
10 See, for example, Rules, supra note 3. 




example of this is the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Hryniak. 
The case was about the role and responsibilities of judges in hearing 
motions for summary judgment – could and should they take a more 
active role and make decisive findings that will dispose of actions at a 
relatively early stage in the proceedings?  The traditional approach had 
been that judges should only grant such motions where there was no 
genuine issue for trial and there were no significant issues of credibility. 
The rationale was that litigants should only have their right to a fair trial 
curtailed and denied in the most compelling of circumstances. The 
Hryniak decision changed all that. 
The case involved a fraud action in which the defendant Hryniak had 
allegedly and fraudulently induced some people to invest in a dubious off-
shore investment opportunity. The plaintiffs brought a motion for 
summary judgment. The judge utilised powers under Ontario’s Rule 20 to 
hear and weigh evidence, test Hryniak’s credibility, and make factual 
findings. He decided that a trial was not required and Hryniak had 
committed the tort of fraud. The Supreme Court approved of this way of 
proceeding. On behalf of the Court, although she emphasized that the 
apparent need to maintain timely and uncompromised procedural farness, 
Justice Karakatsanis contended that “undue process and protracted trials, 
with unnecessary expense and delay, can prevent the fair and just 
resolution of disputes.”11  Encouraging the use of alternative processes 
instead of full trials to resolve cases, she considered that a proportionate 
and working balance should be struck between full access to courts and 
the costs and dilatoriness of such access: “the proportionality principle 
means that the best forum for resolving a dispute is not always that with 
the most painstaking procedure.”12 
While it would be foolish to pretend that time and money were not 
important factors to be weighed in the balance of justice, it is surely 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater to deny litigants (against whom 
judgment is given) a right to a hearing without all the usual protections 
and procedures of a conventional trial: the truncated and narrow 
opportunity afforded by a motion is not always adequate. Indeed, the 
 
11  Hryniak v Mauldin, [2014] 1 SCR 8 at para 24 [Hryniak]. For a strong analysis, see 
Barbara Billingsley, “Hryniak v. Mauldin Comes To Alberta: Summary Judgment, 
Culture Shift, And The Future Of Civil Trials,” (2017) 55:1 Alta L Rev 1. 
12  Hryniak, ibid at para 28. On the powerful impact of costs and fees, see infra pp. 
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thrust of Justice Karakatsanis’s argument is that the connection between 
procedural fairness and merits-based adjudication is weak and that the full 
right to be heard is not always the gold standard of procedural fairness. In 
contrast to the rigorous arguments in favour of procedural fairness in 
administrative law, the Supreme Court in Hryniak seemed to be almost 
cavalier in its regard to its importance in civil actions.  For Justice 
Karakatsanis, time and costs were the guiding lights of her analysis, not 
procedural fairness as a valuable and valued end in itself. 
Indeed, in an early pre-Baker administrative law case in 1985, the 
Supreme Court took the strong line that the values of procedural fairness 
should not be traded off against utilitarian concerns (e.g., the costs of 
providing such fair procedures). Justice Wilson held that: 
No doubt considerable time and money can be saved by adopting administrative 
procedures which ignore the principles of fundamental justice but such an 
argument, in my view, misses the point…. The principles of natural justice and 
procedural fairness which have long been espoused by our courts implicitly 
recognize that a balance of administrative convenience does not override the 
need to adhere to these principles.13 
In most administrative law contexts, of course, these resources will be 
those of the government; they are providing the institutions and personnel 
of administration. In civil actions, while the government underwrites the 
costs of courts and judges, the main sources of expense and funding lie 
with the litigants; the primary and largest cost is for lawyers’ services and 
fees. This is no small difference. Nevertheless, except in circumstances 
where there is a frivolous and vexatious claim being made, it seems wrong-
headed to relegate procedural fairness to a second-level consideration. 
Justice Karakatsanis’s insistence that “the best forum for resolving a 
dispute is not always that with the most painstaking procedure”14 seems to 
 
13  Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177 at 218-19 [Singh] per 
Wilson J. 
14  Hyrniak, supra note 11. In fairness, it should be added that Hryniak has been used in 
the administrative context to justify there being no need for a full hearing. For 
example, in rejecting the need for a full hearing in regard to a human rights 
complaint, the court held, relying upon the logic of Hryniak, that “what is true for the 
traditional civil trial system is even more applicable to the administrative tribunal 
system, which was designed to be a more expeditious and cost-effective process for the 
resolution of disputes…. Principles of natural justice and procedural fairness do not 
always require a full trial-like hearing.” See Aiken v. Ottawa Police Services Board, 2015 
ONSC 3793 (Div Ct) at paras 33-34 per Molloy J. 




run counter to the basic rationale behind the need for procedural fairness 
– that fair procedures will more likely lead to fairer results. While not all 
cases need to be given the first-class treatment that the Rules would confer 
and recommend, it is a large step to relegating procedural fairness to an 
also-ran in the journey to substantive justice.  
After all, access to civil justice is heavily constrained by the costliness 
and dilatoriness of the process. If this is to be improved, these features 
must be tackled directly. The Hryniak approach is more about responding 
to and reducing the harm caused by such problems; it does not address or 
focus on the causes of that harm – the civil process is breaking under its 
own costly weight and that load needs to be significantly lightened. 
Judicial measures to tackle costliness and dilatoriness must be taken. It is 
insufficient that judges, like Justice Karakatsanis and her colleagues, are 
simply content to adjust other components of the process, like summary 
judgment, to accommodate the costly and delayed nature of the civil 
process. As such, constraining even further the quality of procedural 
fairness is not the way to go. While justice delayed is a genuine problem 
that can lead to justice being denied, it is also true that justice rushed and 
reduced can also lead to justice being denied. Hryniak turns many litigants 
into hostages of systemic fortune. 
INFORMAL EFFECTS 
Of course, the fact that the whole process of procedural justice is 
governed by broad utilitarian and economic concerns, as reflected in 
Hryniak, should come as no surprise to seasoned participants in the civil 
justice process. Although judges and lawyers insist that justice is not for 
sale, any reasonable observer would be hard pressed to disagree that the 
costs of justice are often the main determinants of its availability and 
distribution. Although Ontario’s Rule 1.04 lists justness, expeditiousness 
and merit-based determination as leading factors, it is the expense factor 
that drives the process. Indeed, the formal scheme of civil justice is 
underpinned and dominated by the informal scheme of economic 
dynamics in which civil justice becomes a negotiable commodity.  
Unfortunately, to paraphrase the great William Blake, ‘the price of 
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fairness can be bought for a song or dance in the street’.15 As such, the 
song-and-dance of the civil process is an expensive gambol (and gamble) 
that comes at a high price that few can afford and with high costs that 
many cannot.  
In any system, including the administrative process, there will be 
economic expenses. There is usually a set of fees for initiating the process 
and filing documents in both administrative and litigation schemes. 
Fortunately, the courts have been relatively conscientious in ensuring that 
these are kept to a minimum and not exploited by government as a source 
of revenue.16  However, it is the costs of lawyers that consumes most of 
people’s budgets. Lawyers’ fees are high (an average of at least $350-400 per 
hour in Toronto). In both the administrative and litigation context, these 
amounts can soon become prohibitive for most people; a trial can easily 
cost $50,000. This situation in only exacerbated by a set of costs rules that 
are generally based upon the notion of fault – the loser is to pay a 
significant portion of the winner’s costs. The effects of these costs rules are 
hardly conducive to encouraging notions of procedural fairness. Whatever 
the original rationales for a fee-shifting regime (that is, deterring frivolous 
cases, settling disputes, and broader access), these are no longer viable. 
Too often, litigation costs are out of all proportion to the value of most 
disputed matters. This is not helped by the unpredictability of costs 
awards. As a result, procedural costs are the real driver of litigation, not 
the resolution of substantive disputes.17 
In the civil justice system, a basic force of the loser-pays cost system is 
that the mutual costs of litigation will almost always exceed those of 
settlement. This means that it is reasonable to expect that it will nearly 
always be in the best interests of the parties to settle their dispute rather 
 
15  William Blake, “The Four Zoas” in David Erdman and Harold Bloom, ed, The 
Complete Poetry And Prose Of William Blake (Berkley: University of California Press, 
1982) at 54. One of the first articles that I wrote took such a stance. See Allan 
Hutchinson, “The Formal and Informal Schemes of the Civil Justice System: A Legal 
Symbiosis Explored” (1981) 19:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 473. I hold to most of those views 
decades later. 
16  See, for example, British Columbia (Attorney General) v Christie, [2007] 1 SCR 873 
[Christie] and Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (Attorney 
General), [2014] 3 SCR 31 [Trial Lawyers Association]. 
17  See Erik Knutsen, “The Cost of Costs: The Unfortunate Deterrence of Everyday Civil 
Litigation in Canada” (2010) 36:1 Queens LJ 113. 




than litigate. Although this is by no means a bad thing, it is a somewhat 
perverse system of procedural justice that creates powerful incentives not 
to use it. Moreover, the predominant costs rule exacerbates the already 
harsh consequences of the all-or-nothing character of litigation. While it 
may serve to discourage frivolous litigation, the costs rule may result in 
meritorious and novel claims not being pursued or pressed. Also, a litigant 
stands to receive more when successful, but to lose more when 
unsuccessful. This fact has considerable effect upon the parties' attitudes 
to risk; there will be a greater variance of returns between winning and 
losing. Mindful that most litigants tend to be risk-averse, this greater 
variance will encourage more litigants to settle (or, more accurately, bring 
their claim to a close) than litigate. Again, the primary emphasis is on 
utilizing costs as a way of avoiding litigation. This can only work to 
disadvantage poorer litigants who will be under enormous pressure to 
settle as the costs of losing are so high. 
By way of example, if P sues D for $100,000 (and both parties think 
that they have an equal chance of success), the deciding factor will likely be 
the costs. Assuming costs of about $25,000 each (and this is very low for 
any kind of trial) and a 50% indemnity of the costs to the winning party, 
the variance for P will be +$87,500 for a win (i.e., $100,000 less 50% of 
their own costs of $25,000) and -$37,500 (their own cost of $25,000 and 
$12,500 of D). This means that P has to be prepared to lose $37,500 (as 
well as not getting their $100,000) in order to gain $87,500. For poorer 
and more risk-averse litigants, this does not seem to be a very sensible 
gamble; they likely do not have a further $37,500 to lose. Also, the 
possibility of indemnifying at a rate of more than 50% is a daunting 
prospect.18 Moreover, if D is a corporation or richer litigant (who can 
afford to be much less risk-averse), P will be in an even tighter spot. All in 
all, civil justice seems to resemble more of a game of roulette in which the 
house or wealthy defendant has the odds very much in their favour.  This 
does not encourage confidence that the system is devoted to or even 
interested in achieving substantive justice, let alone providing procedural 
fairness.  
 
18  While partial indemnity is the standard cost award, substantial indemnity can be 
ordered in certain circumstances. See Rules, supra note 3, R 57. If this did occur at 
80%, the figures in my example would be +$95,000 and -$45,000. 
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For instance, while the right to a hearing is front-and-centre in the 
administrative jurisprudence (even if not always available in all 
circumstances), this entitlement is simply beyond the realistic reach or 
expectation of the ordinary litigant in the civil justice system. Although 
much of the Rules is based on the assumption that there ultimately will be 
a trial, this is simply not a viable prospect or likelihood for most litigants 
in the civil justice system. Unlike their administrative counterparts, 
litigants do not get the valued experience of making their case before an 
impartial adjudicator. This is not because the stakes are too low in 
litigation or that the matters involved are not serious or weighty enough 
(e.g., custody disputes or home re-possessions), but because the system is 
constantly pressurising litigants to bring their dispute to an early 
conclusion, often without regard to the merits or justice if the situation.  
In doing this, the main ambition of the civil justice system is to 
terminate rather than resolve disputes; a system-wide quantitative measure 
takes precedence over an individualised qualitative evaluation. All of this 
is thrown into even sharper and more pessimistic relief when it is 
appreciated that more and more litigants do not have lawyers, but are self-
represented. In recent years, it is estimated that over 60% (and rising) of 
litigants are trying to make their own way through a system that is 
designed to be populated and utilised by legal professionals. 19  It is a major 
flaw of the civil justice system and of the lawyering process generally that it 
assumes most participants have lawyers when they do not. The challenge is 
not simply to make the procedural structure more welcoming to non-
lawyers, but to re-design the whole process so that it is usable by the bulk 
of its self-represented participants. Without such a transformative shift (of 
a different kind than that recommended by Justice Karakatsanis in 
Hryniak), any notion that procedural fairness is taken seriously within civil 
litigation is simply so much smoke and mirrors. If the courts lived up to 
their own administrative law pronouncement that “the denial of a right to 
a fair hearing must always render a decision invalid”20 in the civil justice 
system, then almost all litigants would have a case for having adverse 
judgments set aside. 
 
19  See Jennifer Leitch, “Lawyers and Self-Represented Litigants: An Ethical Change of 
Role?” (2017) 95:3 Can Bar Rev 669. 
20  Cardinal, supra note 4 at para 23. 




In contrast to civil litigation, the courts in administrative proceedings 
have been prepared on occasion to order state-funded counsel; this is not a 
common situation and only occurs where the applicant’s interest are 
serious and weighty.21  They have also been prepared to order that filing 
fees and the like be set aside in cases of hardship. As regards the costs rules 
in play in the administrative process, they are much less draconian and, if 
not user-friendly, then at least not too paralyzing for applicants of modest 
or even middle-class means. As with most things administrative, the 
enabling statute usually lays out a framework for paying and recovering 
costs; this might occasionally allow for a losing party to pay the tribunal’s 
costs. For instance, before the Landlord and Tenant Board, lawyers’ fees 
are usually only awarded if there has been unreasonable conduct by the 
other party. Also, the amount awarded is often limited to the time spent at 
the hearing; preparation time is restricted to cases of unreasonable 
conduct. Finally, an order for a losing party to pay another party’s fees and 
the Board's costs is only made in very exceptional circumstances. 
The effect of these rules and regulations in the administrative process 
is that costs awards, unlike in civil litigation, are not regularly used or have 
the effect of depriving people of their right to a hearing or pressuring them 
to settle, whatever the fairness of the settlement. There seems to be a 
much greater willingness to limit the award and use of fees to deterring 
and curbing of unreasonable behaviour; they are not deployed as a chilling 
device, but as compensatory measures. Indeed, the whole force of the rules 
in the administrative process are more sensibly attuned to allowing people 
to exercise their rights, not to contain them. As such, the informal 
dynamics of economic pricing do not drive and occasionally subvert the 
formal scheme of justice as they do in civil litigation. In short, it is more 
about inherent fairness than it is about utilitarian calculations. Civil 
litigation has much to learn from administrative law.  
CONCLUSION 
The upshot of all this is that the system of civil procedure fails short of 
any reasonable standard or expectation of procedural fairness. The core 
problem in civil procedure is that ‘the best has become the enemy of the 
good’. The procedural justice instantiated by the Rules is an extensive and 
 
21  See, for example, New Brunswick v G(J), [1999] 3 SCR 46 [New Brunswick]. 
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thorough elaboration of what a close-to-ideal system might look like. 
However, the problem is that only the privileged few (e.g., the rich and 
corporations) can afford full access to it: everyone else is very much on the 
outside looking in. There is little point in having a Lamborghini in the 
garage if no one can afford to drive it and people have little money to live 
after keeping such an extravagant machine in working order. As 
administrative law indicates, the government must become a more 
significant guarantor of the civil justice system if it is to function and be 
available in a way that allows more, not less people to avail themselves of 
it. De jure civil justice cannot simply be a glossy wrapping on a de facto 
package that offers little or no procedural fairness to the great majority of 
people.  
When talking about the administrative process, Lorne Sossin 
summed it best when he said that, in terms of procedural justice, “fairness 
always matters, but what matters most is not always fairness.”22  This 
assessment is doubly applicable to civil procedure; what matters most 
seems to be the termination and reduction in litigation, not its fair 
resolution. It is not only the Rules and their practical operation that take 
such a stance, but the courts and judges themselves. As the Supreme 
Court in Hryniak confirmed, due process and fair procedures are 
something that can be set to the side or, at least, placed a distant second in 
evaluating and implementing a procedural process that is supposed to be 
fair. There seems to be little concern for offering a set of procedural rights 
to litigants that have worth and value in themselves and that actually 
matter in the daily practice of civil procedure. This is, to say the least, an 
unfortunate turn of events in civil actions – the institutional promise of 
procedural fairness remains a relatively empty and unfulfilled pledge. 
 
22  Lorne Sossin, “The Promise of Procedural Justice” in Adam Dodek and David 
Wright, eds, The Mclachlin Court's First Ten Years: Reflections of the Past and Projections of 
the Future (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010). 
